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PARTIES BELOW 
Appellee/Plaintiff Ray Hunting ("Hunting") sued Appellant/Defendant Pipe 
Renewal Service, LLC, a Limited Liability Company, in Eighth Judicial District Court, in 
Uintah County, State of Utah, seeking an eviction and to recover alleged amounts due in a 
tenancy dispute. After trial, Judge John R Anderson entered judgment in favor of 
Plaintiff/Appellee and awarded Plaintiff Hunting, as the prevailing party, $88,174.50 in 
unpaid rent plus costs. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to review the an order on summary judgement pursuant 
to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(3)0') a n d § 78-2a-3(2)(j); to wit, appeal from a District 
Court decision dismissing action on motion for summary judgment. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
I. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR BY NOT REQUIRING THE 
PLAINTIFF TO JOIN NECESSARY AND ESSENTIAL PARTIES. 
A district court's interpretation of rule governing joinder is a question of law 
reviewed for correctness. Smith v. Osguthorpe, 58 P.3d 854 (Utah Ct. App. 2002); see 
also Landes v. Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d 1127, 1131 (Utah 1990) (interpreting "shall be 
joined" in joinder rule as mandatory). Trial courts determination regarding joinder of a 
party is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Ludlow v. Salt Lake County Bd. of Adjustment, 
893 P.2d 1101 (Utah 1995). This issue was preserved for appeal. (R. 377; R. 481-482; R. 
577-580; R. 715-717). 
II. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR BY GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT DESPITE ISSUES OF MATERIAL 
FACT CONCERNING WHETHER PLAINTIFF HAD CONVEYED HIS RIGHT 
TO POSSESSION. 
On an appeal from an order granting summary judgment, the Court of Appeals 
reviews the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Equitable Life & 
Cas. Ins. Co. v. Ross, 849 P.2d 1187, 1189 (Utah App. 1993). Whether the trial court 
properly granted summary judgment as a matter of law, the Court of Appeals gives no 
deference to the trial court's view of law, but reviews it for correctness. Utah State Coal. 
ofSr. Citizens v. Utah Power and Light Co., 116 P.2d 632, 634 (Utah 1989). This issue 
was preserved for appeal. (R.251-279; R. 369-370; R. 371-388). 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT AWARDED PLAINTIFF $88.000.00 
INSTEAD OF NOMINAL DAMAGES. SINCE RENT AFTER THE SERVING 
OF A THREE-DAY NOTICE IS "DAMAGES" PURSUANT TO THE 
UNLAWFUL DETAINER STATUTE. 
Matters of statutory construction are questions of law that are reviewed for 
correctness. Platts v. Parents Helping Parents, 947 P.2d 658, 661 (Utah 1997) (stating 
"Matters of statutory construction are questions of law that are reviewed for correctness"). 
This issue was preserved for appeal. (R. 600-601; R. 606; R. 714, 717). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal in an unlawful detainer action from a final judgment or decree in 
the Eighth District Court of Uintah County, Utah. Plaintiff Ray Fvnting sued Defendant Pipe 
b * * t * v. - ' K t. i.. . i 
damages. (R. 2-11) Plaintiffs motion for summary judgement was granted in part, 
reserving only the issue of damages for a later hearing. Defendant petitioned (lie court for 
reconsideratioii of the evidence presented in oppositioii to I Inluting's motion, ,-.:\: at:: - : 
necessai y parties she * 3-380; R 478 482) I 'v 'o n IOI ith ] •' • ; 
entertained oral arguments on Defendant's motioiis, but nevertheless affirmed its earlier 
ruling. Again, the trial court did not address the issue of damages. Next, Defendant filed 
a motion 'for summary judgemen: • • ,he issue of damages wl n ::!: I was i iltii i lately clei ned. 
1 1 )e coi 11: t' s fi t !a 1 oi dei v ' 1 i i : 1 i • ^ r • r;11e findings of fact or 
conclusions of law, awarded Plaintiff a judgment against Defendant ;e total sum of 
$88,174.50, which was designated as unpaid rent from September of 2005 through 
Decei i iber< >f 2006 ii tl u , .u \ i< i n i l :)f S 8 8 , 0 0 :.) 0 0 , ait :i :l cc i >ts i i 1 II; u ' ai i u )i n it of $1 7 4 50. (R.' 
817-822). I he issue of the eviction of the Defendant, having become moot, was not at 
issue at the time of the final order. 
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II. Course of Proceedings Below 
On September 16, 2005, Plaintiff caused a "Three Day Notice to Pay Rent or 
Vacate" to be rendered upon the Defendant. On October 19, 2005, Plaintiff filed a 
Complaint against PRS LLC but named it as a Utah Corporation. (R. 1). On June 5, 2006, 
Hunting filed an Amended Complaint which made clear that he intended to sue Pipe 
Renewal Service, LLC. (R. 59) 
On September 21, 2006, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary of Judgment. (R. 
138-140). On September 22, 2006, Defendant filed a motion which the court treated as a 
motion for summary judgement. (R. 180-181). On November 1, 2006, the Court entered 
its Ruling and Order partially granting Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and 
denying Defendants motion. (R. 340-343). The Court reserved the issue of Plaintiffs 
damages for a future hearing. 
On November 14, 2006, Defendant filed a Motion to Reconsider the Court's 
November 1st Ruling and Order. (R. 369-370) After receipt of briefing from the parties' 
counsel, the Court entertained oral argument regarding Defendant's Motion to Reconsider 
on January 30, 2007. On Febmary 1, 2007, the Court issued its written Ruling and Order 
in which it denied Defendant's Motion to Reconsider and affirmed the Court's partial 
summary judgment in Plaintiffs favor as determined in the November 1, 2006, Ruling 
and Order. (R. 594-599). 
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On April 6, 2007, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the Issue of 
Damages. (R. 600-601) After receiving briefing from both parlies' u-uiht i. •••-. rvn r t 
issued its Rulit i.g dated May 3 1 200 / , < lenyii ig Defendai it's f 1 : tioi I f< in Si n i n in; try 
Jud j m - " " <!*. / o v - 7 / 1 ) . \j\i M a y 3 , 2 0 0 7 , P la in t i f f f i led h is M o t i o n to A w a r d Da i r i ages 
and for Entry of Final Judgment. \ K 629-635) O:.- \fa\ 1 "\ 2007. Defendant filed 
Motions to Strike the Affidavits rI -< • -uining and r \ , • i. . • _? 726; R 
7^1-^2) . 
On July 2, 2007, the Court entered its ruling, granting, in part, Plaintiffs Motion to 
Award Damages and for Entr\ of Fin;i! Judgment and granting, in part, Defendant's 
Mofon^ to MUK.J \:\ , -i / t . t was awardeo a judgment against [ '•_. _»> 
t M ^ * • • . ' - - , nbei oi JuwS 
through December of 2006 iii the amount of $88,000.00, and costs in the amount of 
$174.50. The cvnri did -.ot *
 lt. 1 "damages" on the basis of Perkins v. Spencer. (Id. at 
819-820). 
5 
III. Statement of Facts 
Plaintiff Ray Hunting is an individual who resides in Uintah County, State of 
Utah. Defendant is a Utah Limited Liability Company engaged in the business of 
maintenance, construction, handling, restoration, repairs, purchase and sale of oil field 
production equipment and other related activities. (R. 1; R. 720). 
Defendant and his wife Marilyn Hunting (collectively the "Huntings") are the 
owners of the real property known as 5500 East 5750 South, Vernal, Uintah County, State 
of Utah (hereinafter "Premises"), consisting of approximately 20.5 acres of land. (R. 1). 
On December 19, 1991, the Huntings and Pipe Renewal Service Inc. (hereinafter 
"PRS Inc.") entered into a written lease agreement for the purpose of reducing their prior 
verbal lease agreement to writing wherein Huntings are named "Owner" and PRS Inc. is 
named "Tenant." (R. 182-186, 192-193; R. 719-720). At the time of the initiation of the 
lease, the leasehold originally furnished by Mr. Hunting consisted of the shell of the main 
warehouse building and farmland. (R. 756-768). The Lease Agreement has a term of 
fifty (50) years. (R. 192-195; R. 384-388). PRS Inc. currently occupies, and has 
continuously occupied the Premises since the mid 1980s. (R. 382-383). In reliance upon 
the 50 year term of the lease PRS Inc. has made substantial improvements to the 
Premises. (R. 382-383). 
At no time during the more than twenty year period that PRS Inc. has occupied the 
Premises pursuant to the lease agreement has it breached the terms of either the verbal 
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lease agreement or the written Lease Agreement, i^v. It -i, R. 252; R. S72 p *" > 
time have the Huntings initiated litigation to challenge the validity ol «_I..I.U me ^ ,,1 
lease agreement or the written Lease Agreement or of : • R. 
252) •' - - < .• • die agreed upon sin i i of 
$.\u00.00 outlined in the Agreement. (K. 154). 
In 2004, PRS Inc. created additional business entities to better serve its growing 
needs. One such entity was Defend^: . ; a^ Kcae^ a. :• \ •.  f ^ *e 
limited liability coi i ipat ly sei ved as a i t tai lagerial entity overseeing the day-to-day uccvi:> ai 
the various business entities' operations. Accordingly it paid many of PRS Inc.'s bills 
including rent to the Huntings. (R. 71()-~^1* r*or approximately 18 months said practice 
continued withoi it objection In »iii i In I Itiittmui |K A, • | > | > M N* notice fa IIIIIII."I«> 
pa\ u nil MI *1111i • a I'm \ hi' illn i In * I, i iimc ft on i Tipe Renewal Service, LLC" rather 
than "Pipe Renewal Service, [tie1 was ever sent, t i- S"~2 p ";• Then >;•< August 15, 2005, 
Hunting sent Defenda r.t - ,^.licc of rent increase. (R r-x The notice stated thai i'i.ma f 
knew not waem "ic ajau. .: < had no contract w ilh I ivfetitlaiil and Hi it munlhlc rent 
^ » ^ n.Msod ::oni ^2,000.00 to $7,500.00 per month. (R. 6). 
During the course of the proceedings Plaintiff motioned the tv\:i] r Mirt tV 
summary judgmer^ -'R 11<3M0) v; defense, Detenu ca \ -ca ^ .- . ^u \ - n! 
between, the Mm mi . «M • : • - • \>^ubbiun pi\>r--|y 
flow ed froi n the tenant- not Plaintiff (R. 251-279). However, ihe tn.a v.'uut ^onuudol 
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that the LLC defendant had not responded by affidavit and that it was therefore justified 
in granting summary judgement in favor of Plaintiff, reserving the issue of damages for a 
later hearing. (R. 340-343). 
In response to the trial court's ruling, the Defendant filed a motion for 
reconsideration on several grounds. (R. 369-370). One such reason was that Defendant 
failed to join the PRS Inc. as a necessary party. (R. 377). The Defendant also urged the 
court to modify its ruling on the basis that the lease agreement meet the requirements for 
a self-authenticating document under Rule 902(8) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
(R. 373-374). After the parties were given an opportunity to appropriately brief the issues, 
the court entered a ruling in which it set the motion for a hearing and stated "the Court is 
prepared to order PRS, Inc. be joined", and that it would do so unless "the parties can 
adequately explain why PRS, Inc. should not be joined." (R. 577-580). At the hearing 
Defendant asserted that the PRS, Inc. and others were necessary parties. (R. 872 p. 5, p. 
11). The Plaintiff asserted that Defendant was the only necessary party and presented 
four cases for the first time at the hearing, which Plaintiff believed supported this 
assertion. (R. 872 p. 15). 
With only a brief opportunity to glance over the cases during the hearing, 
Defendant asserted that all four cases were inapplicable as they dealt with situations 
where the additional parties entered the premises after the defendant had been served with 
the three day notice. (R. 872 pp. 27-28). The court took the issue under advisement and 
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uhiiiuh'ly sided with the Defendant. (R. 594-599). ... ._ k_.L ig the trial court 
distinguished Plaintiffs cases and stated that the "Court is still not convinced t hat PRS, 
Inc. is not a necessary party." (Id.) Nevertheless, still ilie 
a party noi di<l il le^iine I he I'hinlill h> JJIKIHI lis enmplaim. ^u.) 
The issue of damages remained outstanding, but the issue of eviction had become 
moot by Mr Ifiinting's own admission as the PRS LLC had vacated the property. I he 
Court refused to enter an order of restitution on the hnsi * e r- \ : ' ? |Vr " the 
righi •* • * . ) . - • ; • ? N w ho were occupy me the property, but who 
j i a c | n o j . | 3 e e n m a ( j e a party to any preceding. (i J.,« Altei entertaining three additional 
motions the court entered a final judgement in favor for the plaintit; ; w iu;..i sum of 
$88,174.50, WIIKII was calculated as unpaid iuil (mm \\ pit i• • I•*.-r ot 'no 1 lliinmiji 
Deeeinlit'i nf .'I.IIO
 m flu- .miinuil of $88,000.00, and costs in the amount of $174.50. 
(R. 819-822). 
The trial court held that rent was not damages and that, based -. w Perkins v. 
Spencer, 243 I'.JM 44(>|Ulah I'ix?). (ho I"" 1, 1111 f i TI voi»; nol enlilled mudiiiagis. ilie Court 
stated tlit• follow ing, as set forth in the record, as the basis therefore: 
"On this point, the Cour tis Persuaded by Perkins v. Spencer, 243 P.2d 446 
i'l TA J f 1 ^52). v\ Mich clearly addresses the issue of whether treble damages 
*>T :M;i.jv I'd detainer are appropriate when a non-party to the suit enjoys 
possession of the subject property. While the cases are distingushable on 
some factual points, the fact of the matter remains that 
'so long as [PRS, Inc.] remained in possession, r is dill ei.l: to see 
how [Mr. Hunting] could be damaged ;\\ the la.! !i:at j PRS, ine ] 
remained there. Even il [she i IX ] h,-, ; io\ed, j_\lr. Hunting] would 
-9. 
have no right of possession of the premises as against [the 
corporation]. [Mr. Hunting], therefore, suffered no actual damage."' 




The tria. ..: * • '•• " • 01 hianiuil as he docs 
not ciijit" the i ii'Iil \ pI" possession ai id has tailed to join necessary parties. The right to use 
leased premises during the term specified iii the lease was transferred from M- l ^. , n T : n ' : 
to the tenant and the right o r * H H persons to enter the premises does not depe , 
F - : . « . . * : n \ : : v* - l i : • : : • ; ;uiiig>> and Vl\5 mc. 
al<» i: *:*. : • ' ndavii ui the chief officer of the Corporation should have been sufficient 
to create a genuine issue as to a material fact. 
Additionally, the trial coi u t si toiild have required tl le joindei of all ei itities 
oc\ ' . • . : . . i \\ hcic the Plaintiff sought to recover 
possession o( the :M MXT* v. I he obligation to join necessary parties rests firmly with the 
Plaintiff If the court's ruling is to be construed as holding that said parties could ;HK lie 
joined, the court should have conducted the propet two step at u ilysis. 
= «preied Utah's forcible entry and detainer statute 
on the issue of damages. 11ic coint correctly held ihai damages How from the right of 
possession and that the Plaintiff does not enjow th IL ;*I pov^siw.* •:* -\ ^ 1v 
1 leld that i ei it accrued r v r • = • . . ^ .!j;r. J . . ^ . 
II ic coi n t si 101 ild 1 lave held that the Plaintiff, if he was entitled to damages at all, was 
entitled only to nominal damages. 
„1I_ 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR BY NOT REQUIRING THE 
PLAINTIFF TO JOIN NECESSARY AND ESSENTIAL PARTIES 
The trial court improperly granted summary judgement in Plaintiffs action to 
recover possession and damages under Utah's unlawful detainer statute. Among those 
occupying and claiming an interest in the property before and during the litigation is the 
Corporation Pipe Renewal Services Management, Inc. (herein after "PRS Inc." and 
formerly known as "Pipe Renewal Service, Inc."). The Court's ruling on the merits of 
this case without PRS Inc. as a party to the litigation is improper. Reader v. District 
Court, 98 Utah 1, 94 P.2d 858 (1939)(stating " The failure of the court to obtain 
jurisdiction over one of the indispensable parties rendered the judgment as to all of them 
void."). 
Utah case law clearly states that if the object of the action is to recover possession 
or use of property, then parties who are in possession and claim an interest in the property 
are necessary and indispensable parties to the action. Bonneville Tower v. Thompson 
Michie Assoc., 728 P.2d 1017, 1019 (Utah 1986) (stating "If, as set forth in the prayer of 
plaintiffs complaint, an objective of the action is to recover possession or use of the 
property, then the parties who are in possession and claim ownership are necessary and 
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indi • vnsable parties to the action"), sec also Massachusetts and Southern Construction 
Co. v. Cane Creek Township, 155 U.S. 283, 15 S.Ct. 91 V) F .Fd. 152 (1894). 
Rule 19 of the I J*;!,: •• !'^ o r r ^ ;f; \ . J u r e n l so ntf :- : -^  (u [ i i eu ' l l l ihi t * | v tit 
sitnatio -i. '•• ' «• Absence complete relief cannot 
be accorded." Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 19(a). Rule 19 further states that the "pleader," here 
the Plaintiff I luiittiig, "shall state" the names of those parties and "state the reasons why 
they r.re no! IUI^O ; ..: , tfr\ 
! •> 78-36-7 airports a contention that 
Plaintiff was not obligated to join other parties occupying the premises despite the 
requirements of Rule 19. The statute actually states, 
No person other than the tenant of the premises, a lease 
signer, and subtenant if there is one in the actual occupation 
of the premises when the action is commenced, shall be made 
a party defendant in the proceeding, . . ., nor shall atly 
proceeding abate, nor the plaintiff be nonsuited, for the 
nonjoinder of any person vvl ^ might have been made a party 
defendant; but when it appears that my of the parties served 
with process or appearing in the proceedings are guilty, 
judgment shall be rendered against those parties. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-7(1) (1953, as amended). 
In light of the facts of this case that there is another entity, i'K •*• . -K . :; r >*. ! **! • 
has a written lease agreement I*-i\v.
 t*-L •••: ^ . * • • • • . = ^ s iui me 
last .?.(> \ca is and lv.it" i n-'lil • possession, a!i oi vvlm.ii is known U; liic Plaintiff, 
Section 78-36-7 cannot be interpreted in a sense that circumvents R n \ ! ° -\\\ \ the case 
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law cited above regarding the joinder of parties with a right of possession where the issue 
is recovery of possession. The notion that the Court should not have granted summary 
judgment without the joinder of PRS Inc. and without making a determination of 
Defendant's right of possession in light of the lease agreement and in light of PRS Inc.'s 
right of possession is not inconsistent with Section 78-36-7. 
Indeed, the trial court recognized the joinder issue and in many respects agreed 
with the Defendant on this issue as manifested by its January 8, 2007, Ruling when it 
stated the following: "It would appear that the Plaintiff is seeking to regain exclusive 
possession of the subject property, yet the Plaintiff has failed to join at least one 
seemingly necessary party." (R. 587) The trial court further stated in its February 1, 2007, 
Ruling the following: "At least one of these parties has entered into a lease agreement 
with the Plaintiff. It would be wholly improper to issue an order restoring possession to 
the Plaintiff in possible contravention of the rights and obligations flowing from the 
lease." (R. 598) Also, in its February 1, 2007, Ruling, the trial court stated the following: 
"[T]he Court will not enter an order of restitution of the subject property until the rights 
of all tenants have been adjudicated by process of law." (R. 598) However, the trial court 
ultimately erred when it allowed the case to proceed to final judgment, determining that 
the Defendant is in unlawful detainer, without determining the rights of possession of 
PRS Inc., and how PRS Inc.'s right of possession impacts Defendant's right of 
possession, all of which require the joinder of PRS Inc., under Rule 19. 
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An interpretation of U.C.A. §78-36-7 that allows for the an unlawful detainer 
action to proceed to summary judgment without an evaluation of the rights of possession 
of other occupying persons and the impact of such rights upon the party defendant would 
allow a prospective plaintiff to analyze the strength of the claims of those occupying the 
property and then bring suit only against the one with the weakest claim, thus in many 
cases avoiding a just result. Essentially that is the process which has occurred in the case 
at hand. Plaintiff elected to proceed against a subtenant rather than the tenant as it knew 
only tenant, PRS Inc., had a written lease. When the Defendant sought to introduce the 
lease as evidence of an issue of material fact, Plaintiff simply asserted that the lease is 
irrelevant as the Defendant is not a party to the lease. 
Aside from being unjust, this approach is problematic from a constitutional point 
of view. The trial court recognized a possible deprivation of constitutional rights when it 
ruled it would "not enter an order of restitution of the subject party until the rights of all 
tenants have been adjudicated by process of law." (R. 598). Plaintiffs suggested 
approach to U.C.A. §78-36-7 would potentially deprive PRS Inc. of a valuable 50-year 
lease and evict it from its leasehold, which would constitute a deprivation of a significant 
property right, without ever making PRS Inc. a party to any litigation. Surely this is not 
the result that the legislature sough to accomplish with the enactment of U.C.A. §78-36-7. 
Plaintiff should be required to at least join those occupying the premises (PRS Inc.) at the 
time the action is initiated and the trial court should have at least evaluated the right of 
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possession of PRS Inc. and the impact of such right upon the Defendant's right of 
possession before ruling in Plaintiffs favor on summary judgment. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR BY GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT DESPITE MATERIAL FACTS 
CONCERNING WHETHER PLAINTIFF HAD CONVEYED HIS RIGHT TO 
POSSESSION. 
The Defendant has continually asserted that the property in question is leased to 
PRS Inc. and that PRS Inc. is the only party having the authority to speak to Defendant's 
tenancy. To this end the Defendant submitted the lease agreement signed by the landlord 
leasing said property. (R. 192-195; R. 270-279) The Defendant has submitted an affidavit 
of PRS Inc.'s presiding officer attesting to the fact that PRS Inc. acquiesced to the 
tenancy of the Defendant. (R. 384-385). 
It is not the purpose of summary judgement to judge the credibility of averments of 
the parties or to weigh the evidence. Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283 
(Utah Ct. App. 1996). The court is to consider the evidence in a light most favorable to 
the non-moving party. Additionally, the summary judgement rule permits excursions 
even beyond the pleading. Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Cunningham, 353 P.2d 168 
(Utah 1960). 
The Defendant believes that its position concerning the rights of a tenant is 
supported even at the most basic level by landlord tenant law,. For example, 49 Am Jur 
2d states: 
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"The right to use leased premises during the term specified in the lease is 
transferred from the landlord to the tenant, and during the existence of the lease, 
the tenant is the absolute owner of the demised premises for all practical purposes 
for the term granted, the landlord's rights being confined to a reversionary 
interest" 49 Am Jur 2d § 484. 
Am Jur also elaborates on another of the basic tenants of this area of law which is 
central to this conflict. More specifically, the issue of who has the right to dictate the 
terms of a third party's presence upon the leasehold. The answer to this basic question is 
found in 49 Am Jur 2d § 487 in its simplest form. In relevant part the, this publication 
restates the law as follows: 
"The right of third persons to enter the premises does not depend upon the 
landlord, and such entry does not affect any of the landlord's rights, provided they 
do not commit a trespass amounting to an injury to the reversion. Accordingly, the 
landlord has no right to prevent or prohibit persons from coming on the demised 
premises at the invitation of the tenant" 49 Am Jur 2d § 487. 
Clearly then, the right to dictate the terms of a third party's presence upon the 
leasehold is up to the tenant. The lease agreement is signed by the Plaintiff leasing the 
property at issue in this litigation. The Plaintiff does not challenged the validity of the 
lease agreement in this action. (R. 2-11; R. 59-63). The Plaintiff did not send PRS Inc. 
any notices of default of any of the terms of the lease agreement. (R 872 p. 7). Nor has he 
ever challenged the validity of the lease agreement in any other action. Mr. Lauf s 
affidavit attests to the fact that tenant corporation has acquiesced to the tenancy of the 
Defendant. (R. 382-383). 
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Considering these facts in a light most favorable to the Defendant, the trial court's 
conclusion should have included an assumption that the property in question is leased to 
PRS Inc., and that the Defendant is thus not legally obligated to comply with the 
Plaintiffs demand regarding rent payments or regarding vacating the premises. 
However, it must be stated that the basis for the trial court's ruling on summary 
judgement is somewhat unclear. On first glance, the primary basis for the Court's 
granting of Plaintiff s Motion for Summary Judgement appears to be that "the Defendant 
has not responded by affidavit." However, this position is at odds with Rule 902(8) of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence. Rule 902 Self-Authentication, in relevant part includes: 
"(8) Acknowledged Documents. Documents accompanied by a certificate of 
acknowledgment executed in the manner provided by law by a notary public or 
other officer authorized by law to take acknowledgments." 
Utah R. Evid. 902(8). 
The 1991 Lease Agreement contains a certificate of acknowledgment, the mark of 
the notary public, and was executed by Ray Hunting who is the Plaintiff in this litigation. 
The trail court did not offer any legal justification to dismiss the document for lack of 
affidavit. Based on the Utah Rules of Evidence, the Court therefore should have 
considered the Lease Agreement without an additional affidavit. The Plaintiff, in his 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Reconsider agreed with this 
statement of law, but then asserted that the lease agreement was excluded on relevancy 
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grounds. (R. 424). The trial court's ruling on the motion made no effort to clarify the 
basis for its ruling. 
It appears the original November 1, 2007, ruling did, as an afterthought, suggest 
that the lease agreement may be irrelevant. However, for the reasons stated above, 
defendant submits that the lease agreement is central to the litigation and far from 
irrelevant. Evidence that has even the slightest probative value is relevant. State v. 
Jaeger, 973 P.2d 404 (Utah 1999). Furthermore, even evidence that is only slightly 
probative is "relevant". State v. Martin, 44 P.3d 805 (Utah 2002). Here, the Court is to 
determine whether Plaintiff has a legal right to require Defendant to comply with requests 
for back rent and to vacate the property. The Lease Agreement goes to the very heart of 
these issues and is clearly relevant. 
In conclusion, PRS Inc.'s right of possession and the lease agreement are clearly 
relevant, were properly presented to the trial court, and constitute issues of material fact 
that should have prevented the trial court from ailing in Plaintiffs favor on summary 
judgment. The trial court thus erred in so ruling. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT AWARDED PLAINTIFF $88,000.00 
INSTEAD OF NOMINAL DAMAGES. SINCE RENT AFTER THE SERVING 
OF A THREE-DAY NOTICE IS "DAMAGES" PURSUANT TO THE 
UNLAWFUL DETAINER STATUTE. 
Even if this Court were to uphold the trial court's decision regarding summary 
judgement on the issue of unlawful detainer, the award of $88,174.50 is improper. The 
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Defendant notes that the trial court's detemiination that additional rent did not constitute 
"damages" is a matter of statutory construction and it should be reviewed for correctness. 
Platts v. Parents Helping Parents, 947 P.2d 658, 661 (Utah 1997) (stating ""Matters of 
statutory construction are questions of law that are reviewed for correctness"). 
As has been set forth supra, Plaintiff has no right to occupancy, and therefore 
suffered no actual damage. Thus, nominal damages to vindicate Plaintiffs right to 
possession is all that could be properly awarded. Perkins v. Spencer, 243 P.2d 446, 449 
(Utah 1952) (stating, "So long as he remained in possession it is difficult to see how the 
Spencers could have been damaged....they, therefore, suffered no actual damage"). The 
trial court's ruling on damages echoed the holding in Perkins, but nevertheless awarded 
$88,174.50, apparently reasoning that rent accruing while one is in unlawful detainer does 
not constitute "damages." (R. 817-822). However, Utah case law is clear that after a 
termination of tenancy by notice to quit, rent owing thereafter is not rent but "damages." 
Forrester v. Cook, 77 Utah 137, 292 P. 206 (1930); Monroe, Inc. v. Sidwell, 770 P.2d 
1022 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Quoting Forrester, the court in Sidwell stated, "After the tenancy has been 
terminated by the notice required by the statute, the person in unlawful possession is not 
owing rent under the contract, but must respond in damages pursuant to the law. Rental 
value or reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises becomes an element 
of damages for retaining possession. This is not rent, it is damages." Sidwell, 770 P.2d at 
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1025. This is consistent with the plain language of the statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-
10(2), which states: 
(2) The . . . court. . . shall also assess the damages resulting 
to the plaintiff from any of the following: 
(d) the amounts due under the contract, if the 
alleged unlawful detainer is after default in the 
payment of the amounts due under the contract. 
The situation at hand is nearly identical to the Perkins case on relevant points. 
PRS Inc., among others, remains in possession of the property. PRS, Inc. has received 
no notice pursuant to the statute and has not been joined as a party nor has it entered an 
appearance in this litigation. PRS, Inc. and other subtenants have not been found to be in 
unlawful detainer. Therefore, pursuant to well established case law Plaintiff has 
"suffered no actual damage." Perkins, 243 P.2d at 449. 
Section 78-36-10(1) of the Utah Code presupposes that the Plaintiff has joined the 
proper parties and is entitled to "an order for the restitution of the premises." Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-36-10(1) (2007, as amended). Defendant submits that it is for this reason that 
Utah case law states that if the object of the action is to recover possession or use of 
property, then parties who are in possession and claim an interest in the property are 
necessary and indispensable parties to the action. Bonneville Tower Condominium 
Management Committee v. Thompson Michie Associates, Inc., 728 P.2d 1017 (Utah 
1986). 
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Damages for unlawful detainer are based on a plaintiffs right to the benefit and 
use of the property in question. It is true that Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10(1) sets forth 
that a proper judgment on this issue "include an order for the restitution of the premises." 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10(1), which the trial court did not do in this case. Defendant 
submits that it was proper for the trial court to not order restitution since that remedy is 
predicated on the Plaintiff following the proper procedures which includes joining 
necessary parties. The Plaintiff did not fulfill his obligations under Rule 19 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure and the Court therefore properly ruled that it would "not enter 
an order of restitution of the subject party until the rights of all tenants have been 
adjudicated by process of law." (R. 598). 
In conclusion, assuming the trial court was correct in its granting of summary 
judgment on the issue of unlawful detainer, it nevertheless erred in determining that 
unpaid rent accruing after unlawful detainer is not damages in light of the statutory 
provisions and that anything other than nominal damages should be awarded in light of 
the fact that Plaintiff, after a favorable ruling on unlawful detainer, was still not entitled 
to possession of the premises and was thus not entitled to elicit rent payments from 
anyone other than the tenant PRS, Inc. who is not a party to this litigation. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the fact that a third-party tenant (PRS Inc.) was at the time of the filing 
of this action and for twenty plus years prior thereto, and still is, in possession of the 
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premises, by reason of and pursuant to a written lease agreement with the Plaintiff, the 
trial court erred by allowing the case to proceed to final judgment and by determining that 
the Defendant was in unlawful detainer, without finding that PRS Inc. should be joined as 
an indispensable party in order to determine PRS Inc.'s right of possession, and how PRS 
Inc.'s right of possession impacts Defendant's right of possession. The trial court further 
erred when it failed to consider PRS Inc.'s right of possession and the lease agreement 
between Plaintiff and PRS Inc. as relevant material facts that should have prevented a 
ruling in favor of the Plaintiff on Plaintiffs summary judgment motion. Finally, if the 
trial court was correct in its granting of summary judgment on the issue of unlawful 
detainer, it nevertheless erred in determining that unpaid rent accruing after unlawful 
detainer is not damages and that anything other than nominal damages should be awarded 
to the Plaintiff, since the Plaintiff, after an award of summary judgment, is still not 
entitled to possession of the premises based on PRS Inc.'s right of possession. 
Wherefore, the Defendant respectfully requests that the Utah Court of Appeals reverse the 
trial court's granting of summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiff and remand the matter back 
to the trial court, instructing the trial court to consider Defendant's right of possession in light of 
the lease agreement and PRS Inc.'s right of possession thereunder, instructing the trial to require 
Plaintiff to join PRS Inc. as an indispensable party, and reversing the trial court's determination 
that Plaintiff is entitled to judgment in the amount of $88,174.50. 
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is lo da Respectfully submitted this ay of January, 2008. 
DANIEL S. SAM 
Attorney for Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
A. LEASE AGREEMENT 
B. UTAH R. CIV. P. RULE 19 
C. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-7 
D. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-10 
E. Ruling dated November 1, 2006. 
F. Ruling dated February 1, 2007. 
G. Ruling dated July 2, 2007. 
H. UTAH R. CIV. P. RULE 56 
ADDENDUM A 
AGREEMENT OF LEASE 
THIS LEASE, dated the 19th day of December, 1991, is by and 
between Ray Hunting and Marilyn Hunting, hereinafter called "Owner", 
and Pipe Renewal Service, Inc., hereinafter called "Tenant". 
W H EI••< E A S , the T e n ant h a s b e e n lea s i n g <:: e r t a i n p r e m i B e s f r o m t h e 
owner which included real estate and a shell of a metal buildings and 
WHEREAS, Tenant has made improvements, installed equipment, 
electrical systems and made modifications to the buildings thereon; 
WHEREAS, the parties desire to reduce their agreement to 
wri ti ngsj 
NOW THEREFORE, the parties agree as followsa 
1 - FT<EMI§ES 
Owner hereby leases to Tenant, and Tenant hereby leases from 
Owner, upon the terms and conditions herein set forth, those certain 
premi B O B 1oeated in Uintah County, Utah descri bed as fol1owss 
The West 37 rods of the West 1/2 of the Southwest 1/4 of 
Section 14, T5S, R22E, SLB8<M, South of Highway 40 described 
arc follows: Beginning at a point located on the West 
B B c t i o n 1 i n e w h e r e t h e S o u t h r i g h t •- o f - way 1 i n e o f U• S -
Highway 40 intersects the said West section line 1016 feet 
more or less South of the West 1/4 comer of the said 
s e c t i o n 5 t h e n c e £ J o u t h 6 0 d e g r e e s 41 ' E a s t a 1 o n g t h e s a i d 
South r i gh t-of way 1 i ne U» S„ Hi ghway 40 700 f eet more or 
1e ss t o a p o i n t 1oe ated 37 r ods Ea st o f the Sou t hwest 
corner of the said section; thence West along the South 
B e <::; t i o 1 \ 1 i n e 3 7 r a d s t o t h e S o u t \ n w e s t e o r n e r o f t h e s a i d 
section; thence north along the West section line 1624 feet 
more or less to the point of beginning, containing 20*5 
a <:: r e s m o r e o r 1 e s s« 
Together with all b u i l d i n g s thereon,. The area so leased is 
11 a r e 1 n c a 11 e d '' P r e m i s e s " -
REN 
Tenant '.shall pay Owner rent in the amount of $2,000.00 per 
month, with each payment being due on the first day of each month 
during the term of this agreement. At the Bnd of each third year, or 
a 1: t h e c h a n g e p f P i p e I•'< e n e w a 1 S e r vice 0 w n e r s h 1 p , d u r i n g the lease 
terms, the parties will meet and discuss whether there should be a 
change in the amount of rent to be paid under the lease. 
3. IfeUM OF LUIS LEASi. 
The term of this lease shall he for fifty (50) years, commencing 
with the date of this agreement, unless canceled as provided herein,, 
4. ENTRY AND INBPILiniQN 
Owner or its legal representatives shall have free access to the 
Premi ses hereby leased daring usual business hours for the purpose of 
examining or e>dii bi t i ng the same or to make needed repairs or 
a 11 e r a t i o n s o f s a i d P r e m i s e s t h a t 0 w n e r may s e e fit t o m a k e • 
3. DANAGE OR DESjmJEIIQN BYJFJLBE OR (TITIER CABUALIY 
If the Premises shall be destroyed or rendered untenantable, 
either wholly or in part, by fire or other unavoidable casualty, 
Owner may, at its option, restore the Premises to its previous 
condition, and in the meantime, the rent shall be abated in the same 
preportion as the ui11enantable porti on or the Premi ses bears to the 
whole thereof; but. unless Owner, within thirty (30) days after- the 
happening of any such casualty, shall notify Tenant of its election 
to so restore said Premises, this lease shal 1 thereupon terminate and 
en(.1; pr ovi ded however 'I"enant may cani:::el t h i s lease un 1 ess the 
Premises can be made ten an table within sixty (60) days of such 
casualty., 
6 - AQEiBEitLS AND INmLllNllY. fiXJEfclObli 
Tenant shall defend and indemnify Owner and save them harmless 
from and against any and all liability, damages, costs or expenses, 
including attorneys' fees, on account of injuries to the person or 
property of Owner or any other tenant or other person rightfully on 
t h e P r e m :i. s e s i f s u<::: h :i. n j u r i e s a r e e a u s e d b y t h e n e g 1 i g e n c e o r 
misconduct of Tenant, or its officers, agents, servants, or employees 
in or- about the I"'romi. ses-
7. NQ WAIVER 
I f 0 w n e r a c c o p t B p a y m e n t f r" o m T e n a 1it o n t h i s c o n tr a c 1 i n a n 
amoun t 1 es«•;> I:hai) or at a time 1 ater than herei n provi (:Jed , such 
acc ep t anc e w:i 11 no t c on st i t u t e a mod i f i cat i on of 1h i s <:: on t r ac t or a 
waiver of Owner's rights to full and timely future performance by 
Tenant„ 
EL QfiVENMI A0.A.I.NSI LIENS 
0 w n e i" s <:: o v e n ant t o keep t h e P r e m i s e s f r e e a n d c lea r o f all lie n s 
and encumbrances resulting from acts of Owners- Owners agree to keep 
cur rent the payments on all obligations to which Tenant 's interest is 
subor <li na te. EJhoul d Owner def aul t on the f oregoi ng covenants on any 
one or more occasions, Tenant may, at Tenant's option, in whole of in 
pai" t , make good 0wner s ' de f au 11 to 0wner ' s ob 1 i <::iee and dedu<::• t A! I 
credit nil. Tenants' siiums so expended to the rent herein required just 
as if payment had been made directly to OwnerB under the provisions 
of paragraph 2 above. 
9- IAXES AND ABSESSMENIS 
Owner agree«3 to pay all ta>ies and assessments of every kind 
which become due on the Premises during the term of this agreement. 
10. NO WABJi. 
Tenant agrees that Tenant will not commit or suffer to be 
committed any waste, spoil or destruction in or upon the Premises 
whi eh would i mpai r Owners' securi ty , and that Tenant wi11 mai ntai n 
t h e P r e m i s e & i n g o o d o o n d i t i o n t a I c i n g i n t o a c c o u n t t h e b u s i n e s s 
conducted on the Premises by the Tenant. 
11 - DEF AUL;;[ AND REzEN.IRY 
If Tenant fails to pay any installment of rent within ten (10) 
days after written notice, or to perform any other covenant under 
this lease within thirty (30) days after written notice form Owner 
stating the nature of the default, Owner may cancel this lease and 
re enter and take possession of Premi ses uslnq al1 necessary force to 
do so. In the event of default by Tenant's non-payment of rent, 
"I" e n a n t a g r e <:;:• s t o p a y i n t e r e s t a t t h e r ate o f e i g h tee n p e r c e n t (18 %) 
p e i" a n n u m o n 11 t e u n p a i d a m o u n t p 1 u s a r e a s o n a b I e a 11 o r n e y ' s f e e 
i ncurred i n connect! on wi th the enforcement of the provi si oris of the 
terms of .this contract.. However, if the nature of such default other 
than for I'lon payment of- rent is such that the same cannot reasonably 
be cured within such thirty day period, Tenant shall not be deemed to 
b e i n 11 e f a u 1 t i f I e n a n t s h all* w i t h i n s u e h t i m e p e i" i o d , c o m m e n c e s u e h 
cure and, thereafter di 1 igently prosecute the same to completion. 
Buch retaki ng o( possession by Owner shalI constitute cancel I at ion of 
thi s agreement. 
12. Hi J i!;:l T JO I^ANCE L 
tenant has the right to cancel this agreement at any time for 
any reason, upon giving written notice to the Owner. The notice 
shall set forth the date., not less than one hundred twenty days (120) 
from the date of the notice, on which Tenant will have removed itself 
and its equipment from the premises. At that date the Tenant will 
have removed itself and its equipment, fixtures etc. from the 
pre/iii ses and this agreement shall end. 
* 3 - BIM D V A L Q£ ifiUi£!l^i 
Upon cancel 1 ation of thi s agreement or upon the completi on of 
the Lease term, the tenant shall be entitled to remove everything 
that it has installed or placed on the Premises which include, but is 
not 1imi ted to, al1 fixtures, racks, machinery, supplies, inventory, 
equipment, electrical systems, and double wide mobile home used as ^n 
of (: i <:;e„ TpDari I: w:i 11 1 oave the bui 1 d:i. nqs as constructed and 1 eased to 
Ten an t, r easonab 1 f•:? wear and t.ear and mod i f :i, c. at i oi>s e« eep t ed„ 
1^- yOBTG AND ^VJ:IDRNEYM:S FEES 
B a t h p a r k i e s a q r e e t h at, s h o u 1 d e :i. t h e r p a r t y d e f a u 11 i n a n y o f 
the covnnnii t s or agreements herei n cnntai n^d , the defaul t :i. ng party 
shal 1 pay al 1 costs and expenses, including a reasonable attorney ' B 
fee, which may arise or accrue from enforcing or terminating this 
contract, or i n obt ai ning possess!on of the Pr emi ses, or i n pursui ng 
a n y r e m e d y p r o v i d e d h e r e u n d e r o r b y a p p 1 i c a b 1 e law, w h e t h e r s u c h 
»•• e m e ci y :i. s p u i- s u e d l;> y f :i. 1 :i. n g s u i t o r o t h e r w i s e • 
IS- i l i l l J i i &Brj£gJ3£tiI 
I h i s c o n 11- a c t e o n t a i n s t h e e n t i r e a q r e e m e n t b etwee n t h e p a r ties 
hereto- Any provi si ons hereof not en foreeable under the 1aws of the 
State of Utah shall not affect the validity of other provisions 
hereof. 
1 & - B .IN filt 10 EFFECI 
T11 :i. s a q r e e u i e n t s h a 1 1 b e b i n d i n g o n t h e p a r t i e s ' h e i r s, 
s 1i c c e s s o r s a n d a s s i q n s * 
OWNER: 
^ • f e £ 
Mar i1yn ^ Hunt ing 
:t a m L a u f , / W e s i d e n t, P R S 
In -the county of Uintah, Stat© of Utah, on this 19th day of 
December, 199:1. ,before me the undersigned notary, personally appeared 
Ray Hunting, Marilyn Hunting and William Lauf, who is personally 
known by mo to be the persons whose names are signed on the preceding 
document, and acknowledged to me that he/she signed it voluntarily 
for its stated purpose. 
SUE BRUCKNER 
Notary Public 
Ai STArE OF UTAH 
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ADDENDUM B 
ADDENDUM B 
UTAH R. CIV. P. RULE 19 
Rule 19. Joinder of persons needed for just adjudication. 
(a) Persons to be joined if feasible. A person who is subject to service of process 
and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of 
action shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot 
be accorded among those already parties, or (2) he claims an interest relating to the 
subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence 
may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) 
leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, 
multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest. If he has 
not been so joined, the court shall order that he be made a party. If he should join as a 
plaintiff but refuses to do so, he may be made a defendant, or, in a proper case, an 
involuntary plaintiff. If the joined party objects to venue and his joinder would render the 
venue of the action improper, he shall be dismissed from the action. 
(b) Determination by court whenever joinder not feasible. If a person as described 
in Subdivision (a)(l)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court shall determine whether 
in equity and good conscience the action should proceed among the parties before it, or 
should be dismissed, the absent person being thus regarded as indispensable. The factors 
to be considered by the court include: first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the 
person's absence might be prejudicial to him or those already parties; second, the extent to 
which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other 
measure, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in 
the person's absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an adequate 
remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder. 
(c) Pleading reasons for nonjoinder. A pleading asserting a claim for relief shall 
state the names, if known to the pleader, of any persons as described in Subdivision 
(a)(l)-(2) hereof who are not joined, and the reasons why they are not joined. 
(d) Exception of class actions. This rule is subject to the provisions of Rule 23. 
ADDENDUM C 
ADDENDUM C 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-7 
78-36-7. Necessary parties defendant. 
(1) No person other than the tenant of the premises, a lease signer, and 
subtenant if there is one in the actual occupation of the premises when the 
action is commenced, shall be made a party defendant in the proceeding, 
except as provided in Section 78-38-13, nor shall any proceeding abate, nor 
the plaintiff be nonsuited, for the nonjoinder of any person who might have 
been made a party defendant; but when it appears that any of the parties 
served with process or appearing in the proceedings are guilty, judgment 
shall be rendered against those parties. 
(2) If a person has become subtenant of the premises in controversy after the 
service of any notice as provided in this chapter, the fact that such notice 
was not served on the subtenant is not a defense to the action. All persons 
who enter under the tenant after the commencement of the action shall be 
bound by the judgment the same as if they had been made parties to the 
action. 
(3) A landlord, owner, or designated agent is a necessary party defendant only 
in an abatement by eviction action for an unlawful drug house as provided 
in Section 78-38-13. 
ADDENDUM D 
ADDENDUM D 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-10 
78-36-10. Judgment for restitution, damages, and rent — Immediate enforcement 
Treble damages. 
(1) (a) A judgment may be entered upon the merits or upon default. 
(b) A judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff shall include an order for 
the restitution of the premises as provided in Section 78-36-10.5. 
(c) If the proceeding is for unlawful detainer after neglect or failure to 
perform any condition or covenant of the lease or agreement under which 
the property is held, or after default in the payment of rent, the judgment 
shall also declare the forfeiture of the lease or agreement. 
(d) (i) A forfeiture under Subsection (l)(c) does not release a defendant 
from any obligation for payments on a lease for the remainder of the 
lease's term. 
(ii) Subsection (l)(d)(i) does not change any obligation on either 
party to mitigate damages. 
(2) The jury or the court, if the proceeding is tried without a jury or upon the 
defendant's default, shall also assess the damages resulting to the plaintiff from any of the 
following: 
(a) forcible entry; 
(b) forcible or unlawful detainer; 
(c) waste of the premises during the defendant's tenancy, if waste is alleged 
in the complaint and proved at trial; 
(d) the amounts due under the contract, if the alleged unlawful detainer is 
after default in the payment of amounts due under the contract; and 
(e) the abatement of the nuisance by eviction as provided in Sections 
78-38-9 through 78-38-16. 
(3) The judgment shall be entered against the defendant for the rent, for three times 
the amount of the damages assessed under Subsections (2)(a) through (2) (e), and for 
reasonable attorney fees. 
(4) (a) If the proceeding is for unlawful detainer, execution upon the judgment 
shall be issued immediately after the entry of the judgment. 
(b) In all cases, the judgment may be issued and enforced immediately. 
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PIPE RENEWAL SERVICE, LLC, a 
limited liability company, 
Defendant. 
RULING AND ORDER 
Case No. 050800484 
Judge JOHN R. ANDERSON 
This matter is before the Court on the following motions: 
1) Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed September 22, 2006, 
and accompanied by supporting memorandum and affidavit. Defendant's 
opposition was filed October 10, 2006. Plaintiff's reply was filed 
October 19, 2006. Notice to submit the motion for decision was filed 
October 20, 2006. 
2) Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b) (6) U.R.C.P., 
filed September 25, 2006, and accompanied by supporting memorandum. 
Plaintiff's opposition was filed October 10, 2006. Defendant's reply 
was filed October 19, 2006. Notice to submit the motion for decision 
was filed October 30, 2006. 
The Court has reviewed the motions and their respective 
memoranda. Having considered the matter, and having received notice 
to submit the motions for decision, the Court now rules upon the 
motions. For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant the 
Plaintiff's motion, but will reserve the issue of damages pending a 
hearing on that issue. The Defendant's motion will be denied. 
I. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in relevant part, siate, 
[w]hen a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as 
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere 
allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by 
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth 
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Utah 
R. Civ. P. Rule 56(e). The Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment 
was accompanied by affidavit and deposition citations setting forward 
specific facts upon which the Court could find summary judgment 
appropriate. The Defendant has not responded by affidavit or 
established specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 
trial. Rather, it appears to the Court that the Defendant has based 
its entire defense on a lease agreement entered into by the Plaintiff 
and a non-party entity, Pipe Renewal Service, Inc. Where a party 
fails to set forth facts showing a genuine issue of material fact, 
wSummary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a party 
failing to file such a response." Id. Therefore, the Court's 
attention turns to whether summary judgment is appropriate. 
As pointed out by the Plaintiff in his reply memorandum in 
support of the motion for summary judgment, the Defendant has not 
disputed that the Plaintiff served the Defendant both 1) a notice of 
rent increase and 2) a notice to vacate after the Defendant had failed 
to pay the increased amount of rent. Rather, the Defendant argues 
that notices were received, but that such notice constitutes a breach 
of the lease agreement between the Plaintiff and Pipe Renewal Service, 
Inc., a non-party to this lawsuit. The Defendant has not offered any 
evidence to support the fact that the Defendant, Pipe Renewal Service, 
LLC, is bound by the terms of that lease agreement or that the 
Plaintiff is obligated to deal with Pipe Renewal Service, LLC, m the 
same way that the Plaintiff is required to deal with Pipe Renewal 
Service, Inc. The Court, having reviewed the record, is of the 
opinion that the lease agreement, as it has been submitted in regard 
to the Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, is irrelevant. The 
Defendant is not party LO thai contract and the Plaintiff is not 
obligated to deal with the Defendant based upon the terms expressed 
therein. Without the lease agreement argument to fall back on, the 
Defendant has done nothing to contest the Plaintiff's right to summary 
judgment or to create a genuine issue of material fact. 
The Court is convinced by the argument and the citations to Utah 
law that the Plaintiff is entitled to unilaterally raise rents when 
the landlord and tenant have failed to memorialize the lease in 
writing. In such an instance, the lease is month-ro-month. If the 
Defendant was concerned about a unilateral rent increase, the 
Defendant could have negotiated with the Plaintiff and sought to 
reduce the lease agreement to writing. The Court has noi been 
presented with any evidence indicating that the Plaintiff is not 
legally entitled to unilaterally increase rent in this case. Because 
the Court finds that the Plaintiff is entitled to increase rent, and 
because the Defendant concedes receiving notice of the rent increase 
and failing to pay the increased amount, and because the Plaintiff 
served the Defendant with a notice to vacate, and because the 
Defendant did not pay the increased rent and did not vacate, the Court 
can lawfully conclude that the Defendant is in unlawful detainer of 
the subject property. Therefore, the Court will grant the Plaintiff's 
motion for summary judgment. However, the Court is concerned with the 
amount of damages as calculated by the Plaintiff. Therefore, the 
Court will order that a hearing be held on the issue of damages. 
II. THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
By granting the Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, the 
Court has implicitly denied the Defendant's motion to dismiss. The 
Plaintiff and the Defendant correctly point out that "If, on a motion 
for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are 
presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be 
treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in 
Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to 
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56." 
Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 12(c). Here, the Court will exclude the lease 
agreement, and will treat the motion as a motion to dismiss. The 
Court finds that the Plaintiff has not ia iled to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted. Even if the Court were not to exclude 
the lease agreement, the Court would find the lease agreement to be 
irrelevant as to the parties to this suit. Therefore, whether the 
motion is treated as a motion to dismiss or as a motion for summary 
judgment, the Defendant's argument ultimately fails. Simply put, the 
Plaintiff has not failed to state a claim and nothing in the record 
creates a genuine issue of material fact. 
ORDER 
Therefore, based upon the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that 
the Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED, the 
Defendant's motion to dismiss is DENIED, and the matter will be set 
for hearing on the issue of damages. 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 050800484 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail PHILLIP W DYER 
ATTORNEY PLA 
136 S MAIN STSTE 221 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84101 
By Hand DANIEL S SAM 
/ "71 
Dated this day of ' / ^  , 2of/([? . 
iU. L 
Deputy Court Clerk 
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PIPE RENEWAL SERVICE, 
Defendant. 
L.L.C., 
1 X ^ ~ 
RULING 
CASE NO. 050800484 
JUDGE JOHN R. ANDERSON 
This matter is before the Court on the following motions: 
1) Plaintiff's Motion for Entry of Judgment on Order Regarding 
Attorney's Fees Awarded Pursuant to Court Ruling and Order Dated 
October 17, 2006, filed May 03, 2007; 2) Plaintiff's Motion to 
Award Damages and for Entry of Final Judgment, filed May 03, 
2007; 3) Defendant's Motion to Strike Hunting Affidavit, filed 
May 17, 2007; 4) Defendant's Motion to Strike Dyer Affidavit, 
filed May 17, 2007. 
I. Plaintiff's Motion for Entry of Judgment on Order Regarding 
Attorney's Fees Awarded Pursuant to Court Ruling and Order Dated 
October 17, 2006 
It appears to the Court, from a review of the record, that 
the October 17, 2006 order of the Court awarding the Plaintiff 
$1,000.00 as attorney fees has already been observed. On June 
18, 2007, the Defendant filed a Satisfaction of Judgment Regard-
ing Attorney Fees which states that the $1,000.00 award has been 
Mfully paid, satisfied and discharged by check number 5152." 
Therefore, the Plaintiff's motion on this issue is now mooted. 
II. Plaintiff's Motion to Award Damages and for Entry of Final 
Judgment 
The Plaintiff's motion requests an order awarding the 
Plaintiff the following: 
a) $88,000.00 for unpaid rent from September 2005 through 
December 2006; 
b) "$264,000.00 as treble damages based upon Defendant's un-
lawful detainer of the subject property; 
c) $174.50 for costs and court fees; and 
d) final judgment based upon the aforementioned amounts. 
Based upon the prior rulings of the Court, it is clear that 
the Plaintiff is entitled to the $88,000.00 for unpaid rent. 
The Court has previously found that: 1) these parties did not 
have a written lease; 2) that the Plaintiff was entitled to uni-
laterally increase the Defendant's rent as part of the resulting 
month-to-month tenancy; 3) that the Defendant was aware of the 
rent increase; 4) that the Defendant received a notice to pay or 
vacate; 5) that the Defendant did not pay the increased amount 
of rent, but continued paying only $2,000.00 per month; and 6) 
that by not paying the increased amount and not vacating the De-
fendant was in unlawful detainer of the property. The increased 
rent amount went into effect in September 2005. It appears that 
the Defendant has vacated the property as of December 2006. As 
a result, the Defendant failed to pay the increased amount of 
rent for 16 months. Sixteen (16) months at $5,500.00 per month 
(the difference between what the Plaintiff expected, $7,500.00 
per month, and what the Defendant actually paid, $2,000.00 per 
month) results in $88,000.00 of unpaid rent. Therefore, based 
upon the foregoing, the Court hereby awards the Plaintiff 
$88,000.00 for unpaid rent. 
The more difficult question is whether the Plaintiff is en-
titled to the requested $264,000.00 as treble damages for the 
Defendant's unlawful detainer. First, there is no question that 
even if the Defendant had vacated the premises after receiving 
the Plaintiff's three-day notice to pay or vacate (or any time 
thereafter, for that matter), this Court would not have been in 
a position to restore possession of the subject property to the 
Plaintiff. The fact of the matter is that another party, PRS, 
Inc.,1 was still arguably in possession of the premises or had 
legal right to the premises based upon a lease between the Cor-
poration and the Plaintiff. The rights and obligations of the 
parties to that lease agreement have never been brought before 
this Court for adjudication and the Court currently lacks juris-
diction to render a decision on those issues. It is for these 
reason that the Court twice declined to issue an order of resti-
tution or the subject property to the Plaintiff in this case, 
even after the Defendant was found to be in unlawful detainer of 
the subject property. 
The Plaintiff urges the Court to presume that PRS, Inc. had 
abandoned the lease. See Plaintiff's Reply in Supp. of Mot. to 
Award Damages 6 n.10 and 7 n.15. Plaintiff then states that 
"Plaintiff is not asking this Court to adjudicate the rights of 
PRS Corporation . . . " I_d. at 8. The Court will not presume 
that PRS, Inc. abandoned the lease without having PRS, Inc. as a 
party to the suit. Therefore, the presumption of abandonment 
will not be entertained, or relied upon, by the Court. 
Instead, the Court will hold to the position it has taken 
previously in this case. Even if PRS, LLC had vacated the prem-
ises, the Plaintiff would have been unable to retake possession 
of the subject property until lawfully dealing with PRS, Inc.'s 
alleged rights under the lease. Because the Plaintiff would 
have had no right to possession of the property, the Court can-
not see how the Plaintiff was damaged beyond not receiving the 
increased rental amount. On this point, the Court is persuaded 
by Perkins v. Spencer, 243 P.2d 446 (Utah 1952), which (contrary 
to the Plaintiff's reply memorandum at 8) very clearly addresses 
the issue of whether treble damages for unlawful detainer are 
appropriate when a non-party to the suit enjoys possession of 
the subject property. While the cases are distinguishable on 
some factual points, the fact of the matter remains that 
1
 The Court is aware that PRS, Inc.'s name has subsequently changed, but will 
continue to refer to the corporation which was party to the lease as PRS, 
Inc., as stated in the lease. 
so long as [PRS, Inc.] remained in possession, it is diffi-
cult to see how [Mr. Hunting] could be damaged by that fact 
that [PRS, LLC] remained there. Even if [the LLC] had 
moved, [Mr. Hunting] would have had no right to possession 
of the premises as against [the Corporation]. [Mr. Hunt-
ing], therefore, suffered no actual damage. 
See i_d. at 449. Therefore, on this basis, the Court hereby de-
nies Plaintiff's request for any treble damages in this matter. 
On this issue of costs and court fees, the Court will award 
$174.50 to the Plaintiff as the prevailing party. 
III. Defendant's Motions to Strike 
A. The May 02, 2007 Hunting Affidavit 
The Court has reviewed the Defendant's motion as it relates 
to the May 02, 2007 Hunting affidavit and will grant the motion 
as follows. The Court hereby strikes: 1) paragraphs four in its 
entirety; and 2) paragraph five in its entirety. The Court 
strikes these provisions on the ground that they contain legal 
argument or opinion which exceeds the permissible scope of an 
affidavit. If the Plaintiff believes there are facts contained 
within those paragraphs which should be brought before the 
Court, Plaintiff is instructed to submit a new affidavit limited 
only to facts, and not containing conclusion, argument, or opin-
ion. 
B. The May 02, 2007 Dyer Affidavit 
The Court has reviewed the Defendant's motion as it relates 
to the May 02, 2007 Dyer affidavit and will grant the motion as 
follows. The Court hereby strikes: 1) paragraphs three in its 
entirety; 2) paragraph four in its entirety; and 3) the final 
sentence of paragraph six. If the Plaintiff feels there are 
facts contained within those paragraphs which should be brought 
before the Court, Plaintiff is instructed to submit a new affi-
davit limited to facts, and not containing conclusion, argument, 
or opinion. 
ORDER 
Therefore, based upon the foregoing, the Court hereby or-
ders that: 
1) Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment-on Attorney Fees is MOOT; 
2) Plaintiff's Motion for Award of Damages is GRANTED IN PAiRT, 
as follows: 
a) the Plaintiff is awarded $88,000.00 as unpaid rent; 
b) the Plaintiff is awarded $0.00 as treble damages; and 
c) the Plaintiff is awarded $174.50 as costs; and 
3) Defendant's Motions to Strike are GRANTED IN PART, as out-
lined in the Court's ruling. 
The Court hereby orders the Plaintiff to prepare an order 
of final judgment based upon this ruling and order, and to sub-
mit it to the Court for signature per the procedures outlined in 
Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Dated this V day of 
BY THE COURT 
2007. 
OHN R. ANDERSON, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
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PIPE RENEWAL SERVICE, 
Defendant. 
L.L.C., 
RULING AND ORDER 
CASE NO. 050800484 
JUDGE JOHN R. ANDERSON 
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's motion for 
reconsideration, filed November 14, 2006. The matter came be-
fore the Court for oral argument on the motion on January 30, 
2007. At that hearing the Court considered: 1) the merits of 
the motion to reconsider; 2) the prospective application of the 
Court's earlier October 17, 2006 order regarding discovery; 3) 
the reasonableness of Plaintiff's attorney fees as they relate 
to Plaintiff's earlier motion to compel; and 4) the joinder of 
other interested parties to this lawsuit. At the conclusion of 
the hearing, the Court ruled from the bench on the issues. Hav-
ing given the matter further consideration, the Court decided to 
issue a written ruling instead. .Therefore, having reviewed the 
motion and memoranda submitted to the Court, and having consid-
ered the arguments of the parties as presented at the hearing, 
the Court now rules as follows. 
I. DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
The Court will deny the Defendant's motion for reconsidera-
tion. After entertaining oral argument on the issue, the Court 
is unconvinced that the order granting Plaintiff's motion for 
summary judgment should be set aside. The Court's previous rul-
ing and order will therefore stand unchanged. 
That said, the Court understands that by denying the Defen-
dant's motion for consideration, the Plaintiff will want the 
Court to enter an order of restitution, restoring the subject 
property to the Plaintiff. In a typical eviction case, the 
proper course of action would be to issue such an order. How-
ever, in this case, there are other parties presently in posses-
sion of the subject property whose rights have not yet been ad-
judicated. At least one of these parties has entered into a 
lease agreement with the Plaintiff. It would be wholly improper 
for the Court to issue an order restoring possession to the 
Plaintiff in possible contravention of rights and obligations 
flowing from the lease. Therefore, the Court will deny the De-
fendant's motion for reconsideration, and puts the Plaintiff on 
notice that the Court is unwilling at this time to issue an or-
der of restitution. 
II. PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION OF OCTOBER 17, 2006 ORDER 
On October 17,2006, the Court issued an order allowing ad-
ditional discovery in the matter. This October 17, 2006 order 
was entered prior to the Court granting Plaintiffs motion for 
summary judgment. At the January 30, 2007 hearing, the Plain-
tiff stated that if the motion for summary judgment remained un-
disturbed, the Plaintiff would not seek to perform the addi-
tional discovery contemplated by the October 17, 2006 order. 
Because the motion for reconsideration is denied, the order 
granting Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is undisturbed. 
Therefore, the October 17, 2006 order is no longer necessary and 
the Court will therefore set aside that order, to the extent 
that it permits additional discovery to be conducted. This rul-
ing also disposes of the Defendant's objections to the discovery 
sought by the Plaintiff, filed September 29, 2006, and October 
04, 2006. 
III. REASONABLENESS OE PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY FEES 
The Court awarded attorney fees to the plaintiff for having 
to file a motion to compel discovery. Although the Court has 
just ruled that the October 17, 2006 order has no prospective 
application as far as future discovery is concerned, the Court 
will enforce the order as to the award of attorney fees. The 
Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit on those fees. The Defen-
dant objected to the reasonableness of the stated fees. Haviag 
considered the matter, the Court will order that the amount 
stated in the Plaintiff's affidavit be reduced to $1,000.00. 
IV. JOINDER OF THIRD PARTIES 
The Court instructed the parties to prepare to address the 
issue of joining other seeming necessary parties to this law-
suit. Having review the argument of the parties and the appli-
cable law, the Court is still not convinced that PRS, Inc. is 
not a necessary party to this suit, insofar as it appears to the 
Court that the Plaintiff desires to re-enter and obtain full 
possession of the subject property. In granting Plaintiff's mo-
tion for summary judgment, the Court had only adjudicated the 
rights between Ray Hunting and PRS, LLC. However, as stated 
above, an adjudication of those rights does not allow the Court 
to restore complete possession of the subject property to the 
Plaintiff. It is clear to the Court that there exists a lease 
between PRS, Inc. (now PRSM, Inc.) and the Plaintiff. The 
rights and obligations that flow from that lease agreement ha\/e 
not been adjudicated at this time. It appears that PRSM, Inc. 
and PRS Holdings, Inc. have been in possession of the subject 
property this entire time. Yet none of those parties have been 
brought within the jurisdiction of this Court through service of 
process or appearance in the matter. 
The Plaintiff spent considerable time at the January 30, 
2007 hearing explaining several cases, copies of which were de-
livered to the Court at the hearing. Having now reviewed those 
cases, the Court finds that Tanner v. Lawler, 305 P.2d 882 (Utah 
1957) is distinguishable from the present case on numerous 
grounds, the most obvious of which is that the alleged owner of 
the property (Reichert) was: 1) not in actual possession of the 
property; and 2) intervened in the suit therefore submitting to 
the jurisdiction of the court. Here, it appears to the Court 
that PRS entities (including PRS, LLC; PRSM, Inc.; and PRS Hold-
ings, Inc.) have all enjoyed concurrent possession of the sub-
ject property and that only PRS, LLC's rights have been adjudi-
cated at this time, the other parties not having been joined to 
the action. 
The Court further finds that Pinckney v. Snideman, 2000 UT 
App 275, an unpublished decision, is distinguishable on the 
grounds that, at the time suit was brought, Snideman was appar-
ently in sole possession of the property in that case. Here, 
there is ample reason to believe that PRS, LLC is not the sole 
party in possession of the subject property. The fact that PRS, 
LLC's name appears on the rent check does not, in and of itself, 
make PRS, LLC the only tenant, especially in light of the lease 
agreement executed between the Plaintiff and PRS, Inc., which 
rights and obligations have not yet been adjudicated. 
The Court also considered the case of Pearce v. Shurtz, 270 
P.2d 442 (Utah 1954, and concludes that it too is distinguish-
able from the matter at bar. In Pearce, Call sold a ranch to 
Lewellen, who subsequently assigned his interest in a bond for 
deed to Shurtz, who assigned half of his interest to Wright. 
Lewellen apparently maintained liability on a promissory note. 
Shurtz and Wright then collectively assigned their interests to 
Johnson. Then Call (the original owner) assigned his interest 
in the promissory note for the ranch to Pearce, who then sued 
Shurtz, Wright, and Johnson for unlawful detainer. Looking at 
the matter in light of those facts, it is not difficult to see 
how Pearce is distinguishable from the present action. In every 
instance, there was an assignment of rights from one party to 
the next. Further, the very language of the case makes it im-
possible for the Court to rely upon it in the way urged by the 
Plaintiff. The Court stated, "Unlawful detainer, however, is an 
action to remove a tenant from possession and is primarily 
against the person in possession." Because Lewellen was appar-
ently not in possession of the property, it was not required 
that Lewellen be joined as a necessary party, and Pearce could 
lawfully proceed against Shurtz, Wright, and Johnson (i.e., the 
parties in possession). Here, as stated above, the Defendant 
and the other PRS entities appear to have enjoyed concurrent 
possession of the subject property. 
Therefore, the Court concludes as follows. The rights of 
PRS, LLC have been adjudicated, the Court finding that PRS, LLC 
was lawfully served with an increase in rent. Failing to pay 
the increase in rent, the Plaintiff brought suit against the LLC 
for unlawful detainer. The Court's order granting Plaintiff's 
motion for summary judgment effectively adjudicated the rights 
of the Plaintiff against the LLC. However, the rights of the 
Plaintiff against the lessee, PRS, Inc. have not been the sub-
ject of this Court's attention at this point. Therefore, it 
would be improper for this Court to issue an order granting 
Plaintiff the right to retake possession of the property until 
such time as the rights under the lease have been adjudicated. 
Finally, the issue of Plaintiff's damages resulting from 
PRS, LLC's unlawful detainer will be reserved for future hear-
ing . 
ORDER 
Therefore, based upon the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED 
that Defendant's motion for reconsideration is DENIED; the Octo-
ber 17, 2006 order has no prospective application as to future 
discovery, but the Court's award of attorney fees on Plaintiff's 
motion to compel survives; the Defendant is ordered to pay 
$1,000.00 in attorney fees to Plaintiff; and the Court will not 
enter an order of restitution of the subject property until the 
rights of all tenants have been adjudicated by process of law. 
Dated t h i s ( • > • < • day of ?-^- 2007. 
BY THE COU 
4.A.y^ 
JOHN R. ANDERSON, D I S T R I C T COURT JUDGE 
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ADDENDUM H 
ADDENDUM H 
UTAH R. CIV, P. RULE 56 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or 
to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the 
commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the 
adverse party, move for summary judgment upon all or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is 
asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move for summary 
judgment as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be in 
accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, 
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is 
a genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule judgment is not 
rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court 
at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by 
interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without 
substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith 
controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without 
substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other 
relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are 
just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and 
the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing 
affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be 
admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to 
testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof 
referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may 
permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations 
or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this 
rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Summary 
judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing to file such a response. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party 
opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts 
essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the application for 
judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to 
be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are 
presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order 
the party presenting them to pay to the other party the amount of the reasonable expenses 
which the filing of the affidavits caused, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any 
offending party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
